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Introduction
Ellison (2006) identifies three distinct traditions in the literature on bounded rationality and industrial organization (IO). The first one is called rule-of-thumb approach.
This tradition, rather than characterizing equilibrium behavior, assumes that economic agents behave in some simple way. The second one is called explicit bounded rationality approach, assumes that cognition is costly, and derives second-best behaviors, given the costs. The third one models economic agents as individuals subject to biases typically detected in experimental economics and psychology and examines what happens in a market in which consumers or firms exhibit such a bias. Our paper belongs to the third category.
Standard models of choice assume that given a choice problem the decision-maker chooses the alternative that yields the highest utility. Experiments have challenged this paradigm by showing that often subjects' behavior is consistent with simple choice procedures (heuristics) that require less cognitive effort than standard maximization.
An example is the satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon (1955) , according to which the decision-maker has in mind an aspiration level and judges satisfactory all those alternatives that are at least as good as the aspiration level and unsatisfactory those that are not. The decision-maker stops searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory alternative and chooses it. If there is none, she might either postpone the decision or choose the best (or last) discovered alternative.
Imagine that a consumer, who wants to purchase a new car, is interested in only two attributes: price and level of emissions. Assume that she prefers to spend as little as possible and to own a car that does not pollute that much. Whether she maximizes or follows the satisficing heuristic has an effect on her choice behavior. Consider an alternative α = (p α , q α ), where p stands for price and q for quality in terms of level of emissions.
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If the consumer maximizes then no matter how much the price level p is increased relative to p α within the limits imposed by the domain, one can find another alternative β = (p β , q β ) whose price is p β = p that is revealed to be indifferent to α for a sufficiently low level of emissions. On the other hand, assume that the consumer follows the satisficing heuristic. That is, she has in mind an aspiration level for both price and level of emissions. Assume that she judges α to be satisfactory. Note that if the price p is increased relative to p α besides a certain level, then no matter how much the level of emissions is reduced the consumer will never choose β = (p, q β ) over α.
The reason is that if the price p exceeds the consumer's aspiration level on price, then β is unsatisfactory independently of its level of emissions and therefore strictly worse than α.
The satisficing heuristic is supported by experimental evidence. for instance, propose an experiment in which they analyze the source of choice errors by recording intermediate choices and find that subjects behavior is consistent with 1 We interpret q α < q β if and only if α's level of emissions is greater than β's.
a reservation-based model of sequential search. Reutskaja et al. (2011) , on the other hand, use eye-tracking to investigate consumer search dynamics in a context characterized by time pressure. They show that subjects tend to choose the optimal alternative among those discovered and that search behavior is compatible with an hybrid of the optimal search and the satisficing model. The satisficing heuristic has also attracted theorists' attention. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) , for instance, propose a model in which the decision-maker examines alternatives one by one. , on the other hand, assume that not only final but also intermediate choices are taken into account to infer the decision-maker's aspiration level and preferences.
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Since as highlighted above whether the decision-maker maximizes or behaves according to the satisficing heuristic has an effect on her choice behavior, we think that it is interesting to analyze what are the normative and behavioral implications of consumers begin maximizing and satisficing in a market enivornment. We address this research question by proposing a very simple monopolistic screening model in which a monopolist supplies a two-attribute good and does not know whether the consumer is an expected-utility maximizer or a satisficing type.
We find that unless the probability of the consumer being fully rational is sufficiently high, the monopolist exploits the fact that the boundedly rational consumer is unwilling to make trade-offs between satisfactory and unsatisfactory alternatives by supplying to the satisficing type an alternative whose attributes are never better than her aspiration levels. The fact that the boundedly rational consumer sometimes avoids trade-offs (and the expected utility-maximizer does not) allows the monopolist to supply the 'minimum' to the boundedly rational consumer and, by properly combining the attributes, an unsatisfactory alternative that yields the reservation utility to the other type. We argue that one way to prevent this phenomenon independently of the distribution of types is to promote policies aimed at discouraging the fully rational consumer from considering 'extreme' alternatives.
The literature on bounded rationality and IO has been growing over the last few years (Ellison, 2006; Spiegler, 2011) . The closest study to our work is Spiegler (2006) , who proposes a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in a multidimensional pricing framework by defining boundedly rational consumers as individuals that have limited capacity of understanding complex objects. In that model each firm to an increase in competition responds by putting in practice a confounding strategy rather than a strategy of more competitive prices. Unlike Spiegler (2006) The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model; Section 3 contains the formal analysis; Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
The Model
∈ X represents a two-attribute alternative, where p x > 0 is the price and q x ≥ 0 some attribute different from price.
On the demand side there are two types of consumer: the fully and the boundedly rational consumer (FRC and BRC, respectively). The FRC is an expected utility maximizer whose Bernoulli utility function is defined as u(x) = u(g(q x ) − p x ), where the function g(q x ) = ln(q x + 1) measures how much the FRC values characteristic q x in monetary units. The FRC is assumed to be risk-averse and her reservation utility is
The BRC follows the satisficing heuristic: she judges a good y ∈ X to be satisfactory whenever p y ≤p and q y ≥q, wherep > 0 andq > 0 are the aspiration levels for price and quality, respectively. Let (p,q) ∈ X be the minimal satisfactory alternative.
The BRC's goal is to get a satisfactory product. If the only available product is unsatisfactory, the BRC walks away without buying anything. If, on the other hand, more than one satisfactory product is available, the BRC chooses the Pareto-dominant one, if it exists. Otherwise, choice is random. 3 Other studies are Pathak and Sonmez (2008) and Apesteguia and Ballester (2012) .
On the supply side, we consider the simplest setting by assuming that there is a risk-neutral monopolist that produces good x whose profit function is π(x) = p x − αq x , where α ∈ (0, 1). We assume that a consumer not buying anything is the worst possible scenario for the monopolist. The goal of the monopolist is to maximize expected profits.
From now on we denote by x = (p x , q x ) and y = (p y , q y ) the products that the monopolist supplies to the FRC and to the BRC, respectively.
Analysis
We first assume that the monopolist knows the consumer's type. If the consumer is an FRC, then the monopolist maximizes its profits subject to the reservation-utility constraint (benchmark case).
, where c stands for certainty. Proofs are relegated in the appendix.
Suppose now that the monopolist knows that consumers is a BRC. In this case the monopolist maximizes its profits subject to the constraint that the supplied product y has to be satisfactory, that is, p y ≤p and q y ≥q. Let us now consider the interesting case in which the monopolist does not know with certainty whether the consumer is an FRC or a BRC. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that the consumer is an FRC. We distinguish various cases.
). That is, the minimal satisfactory alternative yields more utility than the FRC's optimal alternative under certainty (benchmark case). If y c yields more utility than x c , then there is no way in which the monopolist can profitably screen the two types of consumer. The reason is that any satisfactory alternative yields more than the reservation utility. Hence, there is no alternative z ∼ x c that the monopolist can supply in order to induce the FRC to buy z rather than an alternative whose utility is at least u(p,q). This implies that the monopolist supplies a product w whose utility is strictly greater thanū to both types. Hence, its profits are lower than in the benchmark case.
Case ( 
Problem 3 says that the monopolist has to find two goods x, y ∈ X such that expected profits are maximized, where x yields the reservation utility and y is satisfactory.
However, the optimal solution must satisfy also the incentive-compatible constraints.
That is, first, alternative x must yield at least the same level of utility of good y. Second, good x does not have to be more than satisfactory. That is, either p x ≥p or q x ≤q. 
The solutions to problem 3 are depicted in figure 1. Assume without loss of generality that imposing constraint p x ≥p is more profitable than imposing q x ≤q. Then, monopolist's profits are
The monopolist will screen if and only if ρπ(x
That is, the monopolist will screen if 4 Note thatρ ∈ (0, 1). The fact thatρ > 0 follows from the assumption that x c Pareto-dominates y c . Next, assume, by contradiction, thatρ > 1.
Since both x c and x u lie on the indifference curve that yieldsū, π(x u ) > π(x c ) contradicts lemma 1 and the fact that x c is a profit-maximizing product that yields the reservation utility.
Finally,ρ = 1 if and only ifp = p c x , which is ruled out by assumption.
and only if the probability that the consumer is a BRC is sufficiently high. Since
, then a sufficiently high probability that the consumer is a BRC puts more weight on π(y c ) relative to π(x u ) and therefore makes the screening more profitable.
The next proposition summarizes the observations we have made so far.
Proposition 1 (Welfare).
• The FRC always enjoys at least the reservation utilityū. If u(y c ) > u(x c ), she enjoys more thanū.
• The BRC buys an alternative strictly better than (p,q) if and only if ρ >ρ and x c Pareto-dominates y c . Otherwise, she gets (p,q).
Proposition 1 suggests that the FRC clearly benefits from uncertainty. On the other hand, the BRC benefits too, but to a much smaller extent, in the sense that in order for the BRC to get something more than the minimal satisfactory alternative (p,q) not only the probability ρ that the consumer is an FRC has to be sufficiently high, but also the FRC's optimal alternative under certainty (benchmark case) has to Pareto-dominate (p,q). This suggests also that, unlike what one might think, greater rationality on the demand side of the market (i.e., an higher ρ) does not necessarily imply an increase in the consumer's welfare.
Discussion and Conclusions
The intuition behind the result of proposition 1 is that the BRC follows a noncompensatory decision strategy, where by noncompensatory we mean a decision strategy according to which the decision-maker avoids trade-offs between attributes (Payne et al., 1993) . Indeed, a decision-maker whose behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives.
For an illustration consider again figure 1. In that scenario one expects that under uncertainty the monopolist makes the BRC better off by supplying to both types a good that yields at least the reservation utilityū. However, if the probability that the consumer is an FRC is sufficiently low, then, on the contrary, the monopolist screens the two types of consumer by pushing x outside the satisfactory area (towards either north-east or south-west) along the indifference curve that yieldsū until it reaches its border. In this way x u is unsatisfactory and yields the reservation utility and the monopolist is free to supply the minimal satisfactory alternative to the BRC.
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Notice that the monopolist can adopt this strategy precisely because, on the one hand, the FRC is perfectly able to make trade-offs between attributes, and, on the other hand, the BRC never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives.
One way of improving BRC's welfare in the case depicted in figure 1 independently of the probability ρ is to implement policies aimed at making unsatisfactory alternatives unattractive to the FRC. This would diminish the probability that the FRC considers 'extreme' alternatives and, in turn, reduce the monopolist's production space to satisfactory alternatives only. In this case the monopolist would be forced to supply to both types an alternative that yields the reservation utility independently of ρ, making the BRC better off.
Our work can be extended in various ways. First, in the present work we restrict our attention to a limited class of cases (e.g. one specified utility function, two attributes, one good). A natural extension is to perform the above analysis by considering a more general framework. Second, in the proposed model we assume that the monopolist knows the BRC's aspiration levels. An interesting extension would be to investigate whether the results of proposition 1 are robust to the relaxation of this assumption. We leave this for future research. 
AppendixA. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Problem 1 can be rewritten as follows.
Here are the Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
together with p x > 0, q x , λ ≥ 0, q x Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the statement in the case in which constraint (v) is p ≤ p x . The case in which constraint (v) is instead q ≤q is analogous and, therefore, omitted. We rewrite below problem 3.
Notice that sinceq > 0, then, by condition A.10, q y > 0, and, therefore, condition A.7 must be binding. Therefore, it must be that λ 3 > 0. This implies that q * y =q. Next, condition A.5 implies that λ 2 > 0. Hence, p y =p. Further, assume by contradiction that q x = 0. Then, by condition A.8,
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, q x > 0 and condition A.6 must be binding.
Finally, notice that it cannot be that λ 1 = λ 4 = 0, because otherwise, by condition A.4, λ 5 = −ρ, which leads to a contradiction.
• Assume first that λ 5 = 0. This implies that p x >p.
-Suppose that λ 1 , λ 4 > 0. Hence, constraints (i) and (iv) must be binding. • Suppose that λ 5 > 0. This implies that p * x =p.
-Suppose that λ 1 , λ 4 > 0. This implies that constraints (i) and (iv) (ū)−p > ln(q+1)−p, which implies thatū > u(p,q).
-Suppose that λ 1 = 0 and λ 4 > 0. This implies that constraint (i) holds with strict inequality and constraint (iv) must be binding. Plugging p * x into condition A.11 and solving for q x , we get q * x =q. Next, by condition A.8 ln(q + 1) −p − u 
